This piece is an entry in our Eighth Annual Graduate Student Blogging Contest, “Connections.”
by David Bruno
During the mid to late twentieth century, shopping centers in America served as community cornerstones, providing communal spaces and establishing national social and cultural connections based on mutual shopping experiences and product consumption. Weakening regional differences and contributing to a shared national shopping experience, by 1975 transactions in retail chains, such as Sears, JCPenny, Montgomery Ward, and K-Mart, accounted for eighty-nine percent of all department and discount store sales.[1] Being an American meant shopping like one; those who could not were on the outside. Communities that lacked regional and national retailers were disconnected from mainstream America; this was the case for South Los Angeles. To ameliorate South LA’s blight and incorporate it into American consumerism, revitalization efforts during the 1980s concentrated on luring major retailers to shopping centers that featured extensive security to guard against the perceived danger of the area.
Following the exodus of white Americans, retailers fled the inner cities during the 1960s, decimating urban shopping and transforming some areas into retail deserts.[2] Following the 1965 Watts uprising, South LA became one of the most infamous retail deserts in the country. Conventional stores with hundreds of locations across the country—such as Sears—left the community. Enhancing the area’s blight, the city did little to assist the overwhelmingly African American population. South LA was defined by what it lacked. Middle-class communities, including those in Los Angeles, featured national retailers that were ubiquitous across America, solidifying them as part of mainstream American society. South LA was commercially isolated, making it a community that could not consume in a consumer society.[3]
Liquor stores filled the retail vacuum. They latched on to South LA in a parasitic fashion, as the hopelessness that permeated through the area bred alcoholism, presenting, at best, a morally ambiguous business opportunity. For many residents, liquor stores became the primary location for purchasing food and other goods. Describing the situation in 1977, Lloyd Robbs, director of the Alcoholism Council of South-Central Los Angeles explained, “Our culture breeds alcoholism in that you have a liquor store environment. You have to go to a liquor store for a loaf of bread—for all basic necessities. From day one, a child learns that all transactions will be conducted at the liquor store.”[4] A sizable number of liquor store owners were not native to South LA; many were Korean, which created racial tension. The dearth of shopping choices led residents to call for change.
In 1976 the second to last Sears in South LA closed, creating a panic amongst residents and merchants in the Vermont-Slauson neighborhood, as it was a retail anchor for the community. One resident noted that “the area closed down after Sears found it necessary to close its doors, the other businesses could not survive.”[5] Residents and remaining merchants petitioned the city for help, successfully courting mayor Tom Bradley.[6] Bradley, LA’s first black mayor, believed that vibrant shopping centers resembling those in the suburbs was the answer to South LA’s blight.
The city partnered with developer Alexander Haagen and his company, the Alexander Haagen Corporation, to facilitate the development of three shopping centers; the county partnered with Haagen on a fourth. This approach derived from an emerging reverence for business within the Democratic Party. During the late 1970s, mayor Bradley and other liberal mayors were adopting “the old Herbert Hoover trickle down economic theory of helping business create jobs.”[7] Bradley “believed that only private enterprise—the downtown movers and shakers—could provide the money to save the cities.”[8] This conservative shift was indicative of the rise of neoliberalism during the 1980s. Relevant neoliberal concepts include favoring private sector action over government intervention and reducing government spending.
Fears of crime and gang activity made safety paramount, turning the projects into high-security malls, the first being the Vermont-Slauson Shopping Center. Opening in 1981, it established a successful template for the three subsequent inner-city malls. Essentially, they needed regionally and nationally known retailers and an abundance of security.
The most substantial project was the restoration of Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza during the late 1980s. Built in 1947, Crenshaw Plaza was one of the more impressive shopping centers in the entire country, but like the rest of South LA, it had deteriorated over time. The restoration aimed at turning the Plaza into the center of commerce and community in South LA. It was a much larger mall than the other three, and the last high-security mall built by Haagen, marking the culmination of effective security concepts utilized by the other malls.
Mayor Bradley was particularly fixated on South LA having the same shopping choices as the rest of the LA metro area. He personally recruited major retailers such as Hallmark and Sizzler to the Plaza.[9] Bradley saw revitalization tethered to South LA having the same shopping choices as other communities. In his mind, retail connected the community to the rest of the country and removed negative perceptions by showing that South LA could look and function like mainstream America. When the Plaza opened, Bradley boasted: “you can’t find anything in any of these other shopping centers that you can’t find right here. You won’t find better merchandise or better service than you’ll find right here. And you won’t find it any closer than you find it right here. So come on home!”[10]
Bradley’s aspirations proved difficult as most national retailers actively avoided South LA. Andrew Natker of the Haagen Co. said they contacted more than 650 national chains and smaller stores, out of that number, only sixty agreed to join Crenshaw Plaza. The standard response from retailers was: “No thanks. It’s not our market.” Fear of the area was a persistent reason given. Urban theorist Jane Jacobs succinctly explained that safety is “the bedrock attribute of a successful city district.”[11] Perceptions of gang activity and rampant crime convinced major retailers that shoppers would avoid the mall.[12] Assumptions about South LA’s limited purchasing power were another reason retailers avoided the area. National retailers believed racist tropes about the area; they saw South LA as too uncivilized, disorderly, and dangerous to turn a profit, perceiving its residents as indigent and criminal. The image of South LA and its residents jeopardized its revitalization.
Rather than challenge negative perceptions of the community, the Haagen Co. attempted to mitigate national retailers’ concerns by implementing extreme security precautions. The Haagen Co.’s own beliefs about South LA also contributed to the lust for security. Explaining their view, one employee cited crime as a reason shoppers avoided the Vermont-Slauson Sears. He posited that security precautions “will ease some of the tension and bring in the shoppers.”[13] This approach to South LA’s revitalization is a near perfect example of neoliberal policies, as the city chose commerce and the free market as the solution to urban blight, going as far as to endorse building a fortress to protect business interests.
A seven-foot wrought iron gate protected Crenshaw Plaza, while remote-controlled cameras kept a watchful eye on the complex. A designer of the system explained, “Cameras are positioned to survey all corridors, remote outside areas, parking lots and the main roof of the complex.” A wall of monitors displayed a live feed from the cameras, allowing mall personnel to observe suspicious patrons with ease. Natker said, “If there is a group in the mall that appears to be intimidating patrons, we can follow them around the mall with our cameras and keep a close eye on them, while also having a security officer visible in the same area. This tactic can be employed in the parking areas as well.” Alarms were attached to perimeter doors, notifying security of any unauthorized door openings. At night, the Plaza utilized infrared motion detectors. Guarding the mall was a forty-two-person security force. They were active twenty-four hours a day and described as “neatly attired and highly visible.” In an unusual move, the Haagen Co. directly hired and trained the security force; most developers at the time hired outside agencies. Floyd Simmons managed the security force; he was formerly employed by the Los Angeles Police Department for over twenty-five years.[14]
Further ensuring that shoppers felt safe and business owners confident that their investment was protected, Haagen offered the LAPD a dollar-a-year lease for a twenty-two thousand square foot substation. The substation occupied the first storefront next to the mall’s main entrance. Ostensibly advertising peace of mind, it displayed a brightly lit sign that read “LAPD.” Patrol cars occupying a portion of the parking lot offered additional comfort. The substation was home to one 150 officers and detectives. Writing for the trade journal Shopping Center World, Robert Bond said, “Perhaps one of the factors that goes into making the Plaza among the nation’s most unique and secure shopping facilities is the presence of the city’s uniformed police.”[15] When the substation opened, Bradley proudly said that the mall and adjacent area were “the safest, most secure shopping area in the nation.”[16]
The Haagen Co. believed that the substation would bring more people to the mall and improve sales. In a letter to a tenant, they said to expect business to increase after the completion of the substation.[17] They also cited their own security as a stabilizing force. During an interview with the Los Angeles Sentinel, the mall’s marketing director, Linda Gray, pointed towards an “efficient looking pair of security officers escorting a bunch of unruly youngsters out of the mall.” Commenting on the scene, Gray said, “Actually, this may be the safest mall on the planet.” She continued, “I don’t think you’ll find another quite like it anywhere. And the perception that it’s not safe here is beginning to change.”[18] To Bradley and the Haagen Co., Crenshaw Plaza was the solution to retail deserts in communities known for crime. It was an isolated environment, with the technology and personnel to mitigate uncertainty, providing consumers and retailers peace of mind.
Completed during the mid-1990s, Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza experienced mixed results. Some residents enjoyed the new shopping options, while others, understandably, complained that it did not materially improve their life. Interviewed while shopping at the mall, one woman complained that Bradley had not done enough for African Americans. Referring to Crenshaw Plaza, the woman said, “This place is window dressing. It’s a Band-Aid solution.” She added, “Black people in the city are much worse off than they were twenty years ago.”[19] Observing the socioeconomic issues facing South LA during the 1990s—continued police brutality and wealth inequality—this assessment appears accurate.
High-security malls were a manifestation of America’s consumer and image obsessed society. In this case, the city sought major retailers to bring mainstream consumer culture to South LA, believing they could change perceptions and elevate the area. This approach reflects the 1980s political embrace of neoliberalism. Rather than focusing on infrastructure, schools, or social spending, LA chose limited government intervention, relying on the private sector for improvements. City planning in this way contributed to wealth inequality through the promotion of low paying service jobs, with few benefits and no union protections. Major retailers saw their power and wealth grow. In this instance, the developers, exemplifying neoliberal favoritism towards large corporations, preferred them over small businesses, with the net effect of furthering wealth inequality, especially in places such as South LA.
To an extent, the shopping centers Americanized South LA by introducing chains that were ubiquitous across the country. Residents also benefited from having shopping choices beyond the neighborhood liquor store. However, the malls could not sufficiently solve the structural inequalities facing South LA’s residents or connect the community to the rest of America. Inadequate employment opportunities, subpar housing options, poverty, and substance abuse remained considerable issues. Despite having the same shopping choices as the rest of the nation, South LA during the 1980s and 1990s was still a much different world from mainstream America.
David Bruno is a PhD student at the University of Mississippi. His research concentrates on modern American urban, labor, and political history. He plans to continue his work on revitalization efforts in South Los Angeles, potentially making it his dissertation topic.
Featured image (at top): Contemporary Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Plaza. Photo by Phatblackmama, 2022, Wikimedia.org, CC BY-SA 4.0.
[1] Barry Bluestone, Patricia Hanna, Sarah Kuhn, and Laura Moore, The Retail Revolution: Market Transformation, Investment, and Labor in the Modern Department Store, (Boston: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1981), 15-19
[2] Alexandra Lange, Meet Me by the Fountain: An Inside History of the Mall, (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022), 81.
[3] Janet Clayton, “Watts Welcomes Return of the Retailers,” Los Angeles Times, December 2, 1984.
[4] Celeste Durant, “Liquor Stores Come Under Attack in Black Community,” Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1977.
[5] Ruth Washington, “New Lease on Life for Vermont/Slauson Area,” Los Angeles Sentinel, July 10, 1980.
[6] Carl Coats, “Merchants Seek Mayor’s Help: Merchants Disturbed Over Sales Decline,” Los Angeles Sentinel, August 12, 1976.
[7] Bill Boyarsky, “Ascent of Black Officials Sparks Shift in Federal Urban Policy,” Los Angeles Times, December 2, 1979.
[8] Boyarsky, “Ascent of Black Officials Sparks Shift in Federal Urban Policy.”
[9] Letters sent by mayor Tom Bradely to various national retailers, Folder 13, Crenshaw Economic Development, 1988, Box 2153, Wanda Moore, Bradley Administrative Papers, UCLA Special Collections.
[10] Ron Dungee, “LAPD Opens Sub-Station in Baldwin Hills-Crenshaw Mall,” Los Angeles Sentinel, August 10, 1989.
[11] Jane Jacobs, “The Uses of Sidewalks: Safety,” The Death and Life of Great American Cities, taken from The City Reader, Ed. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 104.
[12] Greg Krikorian, “Shopping Mall is Hard Sell in Minority Communities,” New York Times, May 20, 1990.
[13] Phyllis Bailey, “Vermont-Slauson Center Unveiled,” Los Angeles Sentinel, October 15, 1981.
[14] Robert Bond, “Feeling Safe Again,” Shopping Center World, 18, no. 12, (November 1989): 181-86.
[15] Bond, “Feeling Safe Again.”
[16] Ron Dungee, “LAPD Opens Sub-Station in Baldwin Hills-Crenshaw Mall.”
[17] Community Redevelopment Agency, Letter sent to Juanda Honore, April 13, 1989, Folder 2, Juanda Honore, Business Tenant, 1989, Box 3899, Brandford Crowe, Bradley Administrative Papers, UCLA Special Collections.
[18] Ron Dungee, “Linda Gray—Building A Better Mall,” Los Angeles Sentinel, September 27, 1990.
[19] James Rainey, “Seen Through the Eyes of His City,” Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1993.
